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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is an iconic First Amendment
case.  Its central finding — that a public official cannot recover
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with “actual malice”1
— is a cornerstone of First Amendment law.  That principle is gen-
erally accepted in the United States, even by those who are other-
wise First Amendment critics.2
The fame of Sullivan has brought it the attention of common
law courts around the world.  Their response, however, has been
critical.  In most common law countries, Sullivan has either been
rejected or considerably modified.3  The rejection of a case so cen-
tral to the First Amendment indicates the depth of the divide be-
tween the American constitutional tradition of freedom of speech
* Fellow, Law Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National
University.  This article benefited from discussion with participants in the Defamation
Discussion Forum at New York Law School in December 2004 and from discussion at a
Symposium at the Australian National University also in December 2004.  Particularly
detailed and helpful comments were gratefully received from Simon Evans, Graeme
Hill, Grant Huscroft, Michael McIver, and James Stellios.
1. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).  “Actual mal-
ice” requires knowledge of or reckless disregard as to falsity. Id. at 280.
2. Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1323
(1992) (“Because the ability to attack the qualifications and performance of public
policymakers goes to the core of the modern American conception of democracy, pre-
serving the gains of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is taken as virtually axiomatic even by
those whose views on other First Amendment topics are less speech-protective.”) (cita-
tion omitted).
3. In a survey written in 2000, examining the effect of Sullivan in India, Australia,
South Africa, Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand, George Williams and I
concluded that “most courts in the common-law world are not committed to the partic-
ular vision of freedom of speech that characterises the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution.”  Adrienne Stone & George Williams, Freedom of Speech and Defama-
tion in the Common Law World, 26 MONASH U. L. REV. 362, 377 (2000). See generally, IAN
D. LOVELAND, POLITICAL LIBELS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2001).
9
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and those of the United States’ nearest constitutional and cultural
relations.4
In this article, I will focus on the divergence from Sullivan
found in Canadian law.  Despite the cultural and constitutional
characteristics Canada shares with the United States,5 the Supreme
Court of Canada has rejected Sullivan in its entirety in Hill v Church
of Scientology.6  This article explores the differences in value that un-
derscore the divergence between Sullivan and Hill.  Those differ-
ences can be understood on two levels.  First, there is a different
understanding of the value of reputation.  Reputation is given rela-
tively short shrift in the Sullivan opinion, but is valued by the Cana-
dian Supreme Court as a means of preserving dignity, the social
bonds created by civility, and respect in social relations.
A second level of difference has an overtly political nature. Sul-
livan is an iconic case because, by resolving the long-standing un-
certainty over the constitutionality of seditious libel,7 it defined, for
American purposes, an essential element of a democratic govern-
ment.8  As put by Professor Kalven, Sullivan propounds the idea
that “[d]efamation of the government is an impossible notion in a
democracy.”9  In the minds of those committed to First Amend-
4. That divide no doubt reflects more pervasive cultural trends. See Frederick
Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, July 18, 2004, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=668543 (last visited Sept. 9, 2005) (exploring some of these cul-
tural trends).
5. To state a few obvious facts: Both countries are modern, industrialized, multi-
racial and multiethnic democracies.  Both legal systems have inherited and adapted the
English common law that now exists alongside, and subject to, extremely extensive leg-
islative regimes.  On the reception of the common law in Canada, see PETER W. HOGG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 27-29 (3d ed. 1992).  Both constitutional systems are
governed by written constitutions that provide for a federal division of power, and are
enforced by judicial review.  The Constitution of Canada is found in a series of Statutes
including the Constitution Act, 1867, and the Constitution Act, 1982. Id. at 1-11. See
generally Constitution Act 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No.5
(Appendix 1985); Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch.
11 (U.K.).  Judicial review was instituted following the enactment of the Constitution
Act, 1867 (U.K.). HOGG, supra note 5, at 117.  With respect to the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, judicial decisions are subject to parliamentary override. See id. at
802-03.
6. Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] S.C.R. 1130.
7. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 273.
8. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on the “Central Meaning”
of the First Amendment, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 205.
9. Id.
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ment ideals, the Canadian Supreme Court’s rejection of Sullivan
would therefore seem to indicate a misunderstanding of, if not dis-
regard for, democratic government.  Of course, the Canadian Su-
preme Court and other proponents of Canadian freedom of
expression cases would not accede to that suggestion.  On the con-
trary, the Canadian Supreme Court regards the protection of repu-
tation and of truthfulness in public discourse as essential to the
maintenance of a healthy public debate.
I conclude by considering how this comparative study relates to
a debate in modern political theory between liberalism and its com-
munitarian critics.10  Most obviously, the liberal concern with free-
dom and the communitarian concern with community explain
disagreement as to the value of reputation.  In addition, I suggest
the differing conceptions of democracy are also illuminated by this
debate.  In this case, however, the relevance of the communitarian
debate with liberalism is more complicated.  A prominent response
by liberals to the communitarian critique has been to accept the
importance of “community” in human life but to deny the wisdom
of allowing the State to take an active role in its protection.11  That
response, in turn, has led some to argue that the real point of dis-
tinction between liberals and communitarians lies in the compara-
tive levels of suspicion with which they regard government and in
their comparative levels of confidence that communal ends can be
protected without state intervention.12
The division between the United States and Canadian free-
speech law, I will argue, reflects just this point of distinction.  It
explains why both systems of law profess a commitment to demo-
cratic government yet have very different understandings of how it
is to be achieved.  This aspect of the division, however, is curiously
10. I am, of course, simplifying enormously.  Communitarianism is a complex
body of thought and communitarian thinkers hold a variety of positions.  For an over-
view of various forms of communitarianism, see Will Kymlicka, Community, in A COMPAN-
ION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 366 (Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit
eds., 1995).  For a similarly helpful treatment of liberalism, see Alan Ryan, Liberalism, in
A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 291 (Robert E. Goodin & Phil-
lip Pettit eds., 1995).
11. Allen E. Buchanan, Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 99 ETHICS
852, 860 (1989).
12. See Kymlicka, supra note 10, at 373. R
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underemphasized, and my aim in this article is to bring this point
of distinction to the fore.
To place this discussion in context, I begin in Part II with a
review of some basic aspects of Canadian law of freedom of expres-
sion with particular reference to the Canadian Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Hill, the leading authority on defamation and public
officials.  In Part III, I will discuss the relevance of questions of con-
stitutional text and structure to the rejection of the reasoning of
Sullivan in Hill and consider how the Canadian Supreme Court has
responded to some well-known criticisms of Sullivan.  I conclude, in
Part IV, by exploring deeper philosophical differences which, I ar-
gue, better explain the difference between Canadian and American
free-speech law.
II. FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN CANADA:
DEFAMATION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
A. Section 2(b) and Section 1
Freedom of expression is protected in Canada by section 2(b)
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.13  Like all Charter
rights, section 2(b) is governed by section 1 of the Charter, which
provides that Charter rights are subject to “reasonable limits pre-
scribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and demo-
cratic society.”14  The Charter thus separates the question of the
scope of protected rights from the question of limits on those
rights.15
Determining the scope of the Charter right to freedom of ex-
pression requires asking whether an impugned law restricts “expres-
sion” within the meaning of the Charter.  Answering that question is
13. “[F]reedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of
the press and other media of communication” is listed as a “Fundamental Freedom.”
See HOGG, supra note 5, at 960.  For helpful accounts of the basic doctrines of Canadian R
law of freedom of expression see HOGG, supra note 5, at 955-88; RICHARD MOON, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 32-75 (2000); KENT GREENA-
WALT, FIGHTING WORDS 11-27 (1995); see generally Jamie Cameron, The Past, Present, and
Future of Expressive Freedom Under the Charter, 35 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 1 (1997).
14. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982,
ch. 11 (U.K.).
15. These questions are analytically distinct even if not separated by the text. See
FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89-92 (1982).
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usually comparatively straightforward.  As interpreted by the Cana-
dian Supreme Court, the concept of “expression” in section 2(b)
covers almost any act that “conveys or attempts to convey meaning,”
with the exception only of “violence as a form of expression.”16
The conception of protected expression is so broad that the Su-
preme Court has held that even solicitation for the purpose of pros-
titution counts as expression within the meaning of section 2(b).17
The rationales for the protection of freedom of expression, which
are understood in terms familiar to any student of the First Amend-
ment,18 are usually therefore irrelevant in determining the applica-
tion of section 2(b) (though an exception arises when the
government’s purpose was not to control or restrict attempts to
convey a meaning).19
Because of the breadth of section 2(b), the result in most free-
dom of expression cases turns on the application of section 1 of the
Charter and its subsidiary doctrines.  The Supreme Court of Canada
has given detailed treatment to each of the key phrases in section 1:
“limit,”20 “prescribed by law,”21 and most importantly, “demonstra-
bly justified in a free and democratic society.”  The Supreme Court
elaborated upon this last phrase in R. v. Oakes,22 establishing a test
16. Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney-General), [1989] S.C.R. 927, 969-70.
17. See Reference Re §§ 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Manitoba),
[1990] S.C.R. 1123; R. v. Stagnitta, [1990] S.C.R. 1226; R. v. Skinner, [1990] S.C.R.
1235.  See also Irwin Toy, [1989] S.C.R. at 969, in which the Supreme Court gives the
following as an instance of expression protected by section 2(b): “For example, an un-
married person might, as part of a public protest, park in a zone reserved for spouses of
government employees in order to express dissatisfaction or outrage at the chosen
method of allocating a limited resource.”  I am grateful to Grant Huscroft for this refer-
ence.  By contrast, communication in the course of criminal activity is generally thought
to be excluded from First Amendment conception of speech. See GREENAWALT, supra
note 13, at 17-21. R
18. The Canadian Supreme Court explains the justifications for freedom of ex-
pression in a manner that would be familiar to anyone who has studied the First
Amendment — freedom of expression is seen as a means for promoting the search for
truth, human autonomy, and democratic self-government. See Edmonton Journal v.
Alberta, [1989] S.C.R. 1326, 1336.
19. In which case, section 2(b) is only violated if the law restricts expression relat-
ing to the underlying values. See Irwin Toy, [1989] S.C.R. at 976.
20. Attorney-General (Quebec) v. Quebec Protestant School Boards, [1984]
S.C.R. 66 (distinguishing between a “limit” on rights and a “denial” of them).  For a
critique, see HOGG, supra note 5, at 798-99. R
21. See Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada, [2000] S.C.R. 1120, 1126.
22. R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103.
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that continues to form the basis for section 1 analysis: a law violat-
ing a Charter right must serve a “pressing and substantial objective”
and use means that are “reasonably and demonstrably justified.”
The second requirement, that the law be “reasonably and demon-
strably justified,” in turn requires that the law be “rationally con-
nected” to that objective; “minimally impair” the protected right;23
and that there is “a proportionality” between the restrictions im-
posed and the objective pursued.24
The Oakes test provides a flexible framework for the assessment
of Charter claims.25  The Canadian Supreme Court has resisted pro-
viding more precise guidelines as to its application, stressing in-
stead that the test must be applied with sensitivity to the “context”
of particular cases.26
B. The Constitution and the Common Law
The opinions in most Canadian freedom of expression cases
use the Oakes framework.  Courts consider whether the right con-
ferred by section 2(b) is violated by an impugned law (and fre-
quently conclude that it is) before turning to consider the
reasonableness of the limitation.27  Cases challenging the common
law tort of defamation, however, do not take this form.  Where a
rule of the common law, as opposed to legislation or executive ac-
23. The requirement of minimal impairment is not as restrictive as it sounds.
Though in R. v. Oakes the Court required that a law must “impair as little as possible the
right or freedom in question” [1986] S.C.R. 103, 138-39, the Court later made it clear
that the requirement was only that a law impairing a protected right do so “as little as is
reasonably possible.” See R. v. Edwards Books and Art, [1986] S.C.R. 713, 772.
24. See Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. at 138-39.
25. On the development of the Oakes test in the context of freedom of expression,
see Cameron, supra note 13, at 7-22. R
26. See Edmonton Journal v. Alberta, [1989] S.C.R. 1326, 1355-56; R. v. Keegstra,
[1990] S.C.R. 697, 737; Thompson Newspapers v. Canada, [1987] S.C.R. 887, 939
(“[C]ontext is the indispensable handmaiden to the proper characterization of the ob-
jective of the impugned provision, to determining whether that objective is justified,
and to weighing whether the means used are sufficiently closely related to the valid
objective so as to justify an infringement of a Charter right.”).
27. See, e.g., Irwin Toy, [1989] S.C.R. at 979 (finding that the Consumer Protection
Act provisions constituted limitations on rights, and then turning to whether these limi-
tations were reasonable limits on freedom of expression); Keegstra, [1990] S.C.R. 697,
734 (finding that a section of the Criminal Code constituted an infringement of the
Charter right to freedom of expression, and then turning to examine whether such an
infringement was justifiable as a reasonable limit).
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tion, is challenged under the Charter, the Canadian Supreme Court
takes a somewhat different approach.
The difference stems from the Canadian Supreme Court’s un-
derstanding of the relationship between the common law and the
Constitution.  The Canadian Court has held that that the common
law, when invoked in a dispute between private parties,28 is a spe-
cies of private action not directly subject to constitutional require-
ments.29  That conclusion may surprise American readers.  It has
long been accepted, in American case law, that the judicial enforce-
ment of the common law is a form of state action.30  Further, the
application of this principle in a context like Sullivan, in which the
First Amendment was applied to the Alabama common law of defa-
mation, is an especially uncontroversial instance of the general
rule.31
The Canadian Supreme Court’s treatment of the relationship
between the common law and the Charter has been criticized,32 but
its position makes little practical difference.  Though the Canadian
Supreme Court refuses to apply the Charter “directly” to the com-
mon law, it held that the common law must conform to Charter val-
28. The Court in Hill provides an exception “in so far as the common law is the
basis of some governmental action which . . . infringes a guaranteed right or freedom.”
The Court held that no such government action was present in this case.  The Court
rejected the argument that the plaintiff’s action, as the action of an officer of the
Crown, constituted government action.  He brought the action, the Court held, in his
own capacity in response to the impugning of his, rather than the government’s, repu-
tation. See Hill, [1995] S.C.R. at 1159.
29. The decision relies in part on the text of the Charter § 32 of which provides
that “[t]his Charter applies . . . to the legislature and government of each province,” but
does not mention the judiciary.  But the conclusion that the common law invoked be-
tween private parties is not directly subject to the Charter depends also on the Court’s
understanding of the nature of the judicial power to enforce the common law. See
RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery, [1986] S.C.R. 573, 600-01.
30. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 344 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
31. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1711 (2d ed. 1988)
(“[T]he general proposition that common law is state action — that is, that the state
“acts” when its courts create and enforce common law rules — is hardly
controversial.”).
32. See Brian Slattery, The Charter’s Relevance to Private Litigation: Does Dolphin De-
liver?, 32 MCGILL L. J. 905 (1987).  For a criticism of a similar approach adopted by the
High Court of Australia, see Adrienne Stone, The Common Law and the Constitution: A
Reply, 26 MELB. U. L. REV. 646 (2002).  For a defense, see Stephen Gardbaum, The
“Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L. REV. 387 (2003).
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ues.33  The Canadian Supreme Court has the power to develop the
common law and so, where the common law is inconsistent with
Charter values, it can alter common law rules to conform to the
Charter.  The result is that the Charter provides protection against
the common law (where it is inconsistent with Charter rights) as well
as against legislative and executive action.34
C. Hill v. Church of Scientology35
Hill dealt with a challenge to the common law of defamation
by considering whether “Charter values” require the further develop-
ment of the common law.36  The case arose from the actions of a
lawyer (Morris Manning) who, in the course of representing the
Church of Scientology, made false allegations relating to the con-
duct of a prosecutor (Casey Hill).  At a widely reported press con-
ference, Manning accused Hill of misleading a court and of
improperly obtaining access to sealed court documents.37  Follow-
ing the dismissal of contempt proceedings against him, Hill
brought defamation proceedings against Manning and the Church
of Scientology, who argued in response that the common law of
defamation ought to be developed to include the “actual malice”
rule.38  Although it may not have been necessary to respond to that
submission,39 the Supreme Court of Canada took the opportunity
33. See Dolphin Delivery, [1986] S.C.R. at 603.
34. Mark Tushnet, The Issue of State Action/Horizontal Effect in Comparative Constitu-
tional Law, 1 INT’L J. CON. L. 79 (2003).
35. This discussion draws on Stone & Williams, supra note 3. R
36. Hill, [1995] S.C.R. 1130.
37. See id. at 1147.
38. Id. at 1158.
39. The defendant appears to have known that the allegations were false, and thus
may have been unable to rely upon the Sullivan defense in any event. See id. at 1147.  In
proceeding to consider an issue that could have been avoided, Hill is in fact a mirror
image of Sullivan, which could have been resolved on the basis that the offending publi-
cation did not sufficiently identify the plaintiff.  Kalven, supra note 8, at 204.  In addi- R
tion, at one point, Justice Cory seems to distinguish Hill from Sullivan on the facts:
“None of the factors which prompted the United States Supreme Court to rewrite the
law of defamation in America are present in the case at bar.  First, this appeal does not
involve the media or political commentary about government policies.” Hill [1995]
S.C.R. at 1188.  That might seem to leave open the possibility of adopting a Sullivan
style rule at some later point.  However, given the depth of concern with Sullivan in
other parts of the opinion (see infra Part III.C), it seems more likely that the Canadian
Court would adopt a modified form of the rule that provides more protection to reputa-
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to reject the Sullivan rule.  The Court decided that the existing Ca-
nadian common law provided sufficient protection for freedom of
expression.40
The Canadian common law, like the common law in a number
of other countries, provides that a statement that tends to injure
the reputation of the person to whom it refers is defamatory.41
Under Canadian common law, defamation is a tort of strict liabil-
ity42 that is subject to the defenses of truth,43 fair comment, and
qualified privilege.  These defenses, however, do not provide the
protection of the Sullivan rule which, crucially, applies to false de-
famatory statements.  The defense of fair comment is restricted to
commentary on facts, which must be true (a key point of distinction
from Sullivan) and identified with some clarity.44  The defense of
qualified privilege, which does apply to some false statements of
facts, is limited by a requirement that the person making the state-
ment have a duty to disclose it and the recipient an interest in its
receipt.  Critically, newsgathering and reporting have traditionally
not been thought sufficient to establish this “reciprocity of duty and
interest.”45  Though the Canadian Supreme Court could extend the
Canadian common law by exercising its general power over the
common law or by reference to “Charter values,” it has declined to
do so.  Accordingly, Canadian media organizations ordinarily have
to prove the truth of defamatory statements made in the course of
reporting public affairs.46
tion, like those found in Australia, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand. See Lange v.
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, [1997] 189 C.L.R. 52 (Austl.); Lange v. Atkinson
[2003] N.Z.L.R. 385 (N.Z.); Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, [1999] 4 All E.R. 609 (U.K).
40. See Hill, [1995] S.C.R. at 1188-90. See generally ALLEN M. LINDEN, CANADIAN
TORT LAW ch. 19 (7th ed. 2001).
41. See LINDEN, supra note 40, at 686-87; Colour Your World Corp. v. Canadian R
Broad. Corp., [1998] 156 D.L.R. (4th) 27, 36.
42. See LINDEN, supra note 40, at 704. R
43. Id. at 706.
44. Fair comment also requires that the defamatory comments were made in the
public interest, in good faith and without wrongful intent. See Prud’homme v.
Prud’homme, [2002] S.C.R. 663, 698; LINDEN, supra note 40, at 723. R
45. LINDEN, supra note 40, at 714. R
46. See also R. v. Lucas, [1998] S.C.R. 439, 484-85, in which the Supreme Court
upheld (in the face of challenge based on section 2 (b) of the Charter) a criminal libel
statute that made it an offense for the publication by any person of a “defamatory libel
that he knows is false” (though that statute would presumably be valid in the United
States as well).  Under American law, criminal libel statutes must comply with the rule
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III. EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCE
My principal concern in this article is with the differences of
value that inform these decisions.  Before turning to that matter,
however, I should note that two more prosaic matters, namely criti-
cism of Sullivan and textual and structural differences between the
United States and Canadian constitutions, might also have had
some influence.  As I will argue, however, these explanations can-
not fully account for the different resolution of the free-speech
question in Hill.
A. The “Failure” of New York Times v. Sullivan
The decision in Hill was partly driven by a critical assessment of
the Sullivan rule.  The Supreme Court of Canada appears to have
been persuaded by well-known arguments that the Sullivan rule,
with its focus on the motives and practices of journalists and edi-
tors, tended to produce pressure on journalists to reveal sources,
prolong litigation with an accompanying increase in expense, and
encourage large awards against media defendants.47  The result, ac-
cording to these critics, is that the Sullivan rule has exacerbated the
tendency to self-censorship that it attempts to address.  The force of
these arguments is somewhat disputed,48 but their influence on the
Canadian Supreme Court is clear.49
The Canadian Supreme Court’s reaction, however, reveals a
deeper form of disagreement.  If the Supreme Court of Canada had
been principally concerned with those aspects of the Sullivan rule
that are said to be self-defeating, it could have responded by adopt-
ing a rule that would better serve Sullivan’s original aims.  It might,
for example, have adopted a rule like that preferred by Justice
Black in his Sullivan concurrence, which obviated the focus on jour-
in Sullivan, which requires a demonstration of “actual malice” (knowledge of falsity, or
reckless disregard of, the truth). See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1964).
47. See generally Anthony Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to
Return to “The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1983);
Nadine Strossen, A Defence of the Aspirations — but not the Achievements of the U.S. Rules
Limiting Defamation Actions By Public Officials or Public Figures, 15 MELB. U. L. REV. 419
(1986).
48. See, e.g., Russell Weaver & Geoffrey Bennett, Is The New York Times “Actual Mal-
ice” Standard Really Necessary? A Comparative Perspective, 53 LA. L. REV. 1153, 1182-90
(1993).
49. See Hill, [1995] S.C.R. at 1182-83.
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nalistic practice by conferring absolute protection on false defama-
tory statements about the public conduct of public officials.50  The
Supreme Court of Canada’s real concerns, however, lay elsewhere.
For the Court, the most significant defect with Sullivan lay in its
disregard for the truth.51  Justice Cory, writing for the majority in
Hill, concluded: “I simply cannot see that the law of defamation is
unduly restrictive or inhibiting.  Surely it is not requiring too much
of individuals that they ascertain the truth of the allegations they
publish.”52  Far from adopting the concern, evident in Sullivan, that
a requirement to demonstrate truth would “chill” public discussion,
the Canadian Supreme Court was concerned with the deprecation
of truth in public discourse.53
B. Structural and Textual Differences
It has been suggested that the Canadian law of freedom of ex-
pression is affected by the separation of the right of freedom of
expression in section 2(b) from the limits imposed by section 1.
The explicit acknowledgement that Charter rights are subject to lim-
itation contrasts sharply with the absolutist language of the First
Amendment.  Section 1 therefore seems to signal that the Canadian
Court should be more sympathetic towards arguments for limita-
tion on speech than its American counterpart, which is faced with
the injunction “Congress shall make no law.”54
In Hill, of course, the influence of these factors is one step re-
moved.  Rather than applying section 1 directly, the Court applies
50. See Cameron, supra note 13, at 39. R
51. See Hill, [1995] S.C.R. at 1182-83.
52. Id. at 1187.
53. Id. at 1183; see Cameron, supra note 13, at 39. R
54. See Kathleen Mahoney, R. v. Keegstra: A Rationale for Regulating Pornography, 37
MCGILL L.J. 242, 251-52 (1992) (“The Charter is not constrained by the textual or politi-
cal constitutional imperatives of the American First Amendment.”). See also Jamie Cam-
eron, The Original Conception of Section 1 and its Demise, 35 MCGILL L.J. 254, 261 (1989).
The deferential stance is further encouraged by the flexible, context-sensitive Oakes test,
which as history of the First Amendment would suggest, is likely to encourage the ac-
ceptance of limitations on rights.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s willingness to uphold
prosecutions of leaders of the Communist Party in Dennis v. United States, 391 U.S. 494
(1951), is usually taken to demonstrate that in times of high intolerances, flexible stan-
dards of review may allow judges to accede to pressure to censor unpopular speech. See
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied
to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 940-41 (1968).
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“Charter values” to the development of the common law.  Although,
if section 1 is taken to indicate that the Charter requires a somewhat
deferential approach toward rights, that principle may also be a
“Charter value,” which in turn affects the Court’s attitude to the
common law.  Nevertheless, the very fact that the Court draws a dis-
tinction between the development of the common law to accord
with Charter values and the direct application of the Charter may be
significant.  Where a court perceives its role as developing existing
common law rules rather than developing an overtly constitutional
rule (as the Supreme Court of the United States did in Sullivan),
the court might proceed more cautiously.55
But, even if this much is true,56 these structural and textual
features can only be seen as reinforcing choices made on other
grounds.  A principle of deference, on its own, is an insufficient
basis on which to make the very precise choices required by particu-
lar free-speech controversies.57  Deference might weigh the scales
in favor of upholding existing law, but it does not provide guidance
for distinguishing between permissible and impermissible limits.58
The distinctive structural features of the Charter are better con-
ceived as indicative of deeper differences.  In this vein, section 1 is
said to be the fundamental organizing principle of the Charter, and
provides the foundation for a distinctively Canadian conception of
55. Graeme Hill & Adrienne Stone, The Constitutionalisation of the Common Law, 25
ADEL. L. REV. 67, 91-92 (2004).
56. A generally deferential stance cannot be seen to be a necessary consequence of
the Charter’s text.  The openness of the text of section 1 (“reasonably necessary in a free
and democratic society”) could equally support an approach under which limitation on
freedom of expression is quite narrowly circumscribed.
57. So, for example, a general principle of deference does not explain why the
Canadian court has been so much less deferential with respect to limitations on some
forms of speech, notably commercial speech. See, e.g., RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (At-
torney-General) [1995] S.C.R. 199, 327 (protecting commercial expression). But cf. Ir-
win Toy, [1989] S.C.R. at 945 (allowing the regulation of commercial expression).  The
apparent inconsistency between RJR-McDonald and Irwin Toy might be taken as indica-
tive of the unpredictability of the section 1 test.
58. Similarly, the flexibility of the section 1 test (which First Amendment history
would suggest is likely to encourage) is also not a necessary consequence of the Charter’s
text.  Section 1 does seem to require balancing in some form.  But balancing is also a
feature of more defined (and restrictive) tests. Sullivan’s “actual malice” test itself is
usually given as an example of this “definitional balancing.”  Nimmer, supra note 54, at R
944.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-1\NLR101.txt unknown Seq: 13 20-FEB-06 12:09
2005-2006] NORTH AMERICAN CONTRASTS 21
rights.59  The remainder of this essay will be devoted to identifying
the values that inform this distinctively Canadian conception of
rights.
C. Motivating Values
1. Reputation: Self-Esteem, Civility, Public Deliberation
and Participation
A starting point in analyzing the Hill opinion lies in its treat-
ment of reputation.  Reputation receives little attention in Sulli-
van,60 but is the subject of a long and rather reverential analysis in
Hill.61  In Hill, reputation is described in rather lofty and intangible
terms.  Reputation is extolled as “an integral and fundamentally im-
portant aspect of every individual.”62  It is linked to the “innate wor-
thiness and dignity of the individual”63 and the right to privacy,64
values that are themselves aspects of the free and democratic soci-
ety protected by section 1 of the Charter.
When the Supreme Court of Canada describes reputation in
these terms, it aligns itself closely with a conception of reputation
described as “reputation as dignity.”65  Under this conception, rep-
utation has a double function.  In part, it protects the individual’s
59. See Cameron, supra note 54, at 258. R
60. The Court’s references to reputation occur mainly as it describes the common
law of defamation in the state of Alabama; there is no sustained reflection on the nature
of the reputation or its social importance. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265, 267 (“It matters
not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only . . ..
Under Alabama law as applied in this case, a publication is ‘libelous per se’ if the words
‘tend to injure a person . . . in his reputation’ or to ‘bring [him] into public
contempt.’”).
61. See Hill, [1995] S.C.R. at 1175-79.  The Supreme Court, however, does ac-
knowledge that reputation serves the relatively prosaic purpose of protecting a lawyer’s
practice. See id. at 1178 (“[A] lawyer’s practice is founded and maintained upon the
basis of a good reputation for professional integrity and trustworthiness.”). See Robert
C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution 74 CALIF.
L. REV. 691, 693 (1986) (stating that reputation resembles a form of property, “akin to
good will”).
62. Hill, [1995] S.C.R. at 1161, 1175.
63. See id. at 1179 (“[T]he good reputation of the individual represents and re-
flects the innate dignity of the individual, a concept which underlies all the Charter
rights.”).
64. This was accorded constitutional protection in R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.R. 417,
427. See Hill, [1995] S.C.R. at 1179.
65. Post, supra note 61, at 707-08. R
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interest in the preservation of self-esteem, protecting against the
humiliation involved in the dissemination of defamatory state-
ments.  But, in addition, the preservation of reputation serves a
public purpose by providing a mechanism for the ordering of social
relations.  This latter element is reflected in the Canadian Supreme
Court’s description of reputation as “at the base of any system of
ordered liberty,” and as the “fundamental foundation on which
people are able to interact with each other in social environ-
ments.”66  The idea is that reputation is a means by which a commu-
nity determines those who are to be accorded the respect due to
full members and those who will be denied that respect.  As ex-
plained by Professor Robert Post:
[T]he dignity that defamation law protects is thus the re-
spect (and self-respect) that arises from full membership
in society.  Rules of civility are the means by which society
defines and maintains this dignity.  Conversely, rules of
civility are also the means by which society defines and
distinguishes members from non-members.67
In addition to its role in promoting dignity, the Court in Hill
also seems to accord the protection of reputation an overtly politi-
cal role.  The protection of reputation is said to improve the quality
of, and participation in, public discourse in a manner that pro-
motes democratic government.  At this point, the significance of
the Canadian Supreme Court’s emphasis on truth is evident.  Insist-
ing on truth is a means by which the Canadian Supreme Court pro-
tects the quality of public discourse.  In its view, the Sullivan actual
malice rule risks leaving a false statement uncorrected.  If a public
official cannot show that a false statement was motivated by actual
malice, the statement may never be legally challenged and, even
when it is, the focus of proceeding will be on the conduct of the
defendant and not the truth of the challenged statement.  The re-
sult, in the eyes of the Canadian Supreme Court, is to endanger
66. Hill, [1995] S.C.R. at 1175 (quoting David Lepofsky, Making Sense of the Libel
Chill Debate: Do Libel Laws ‘Chill’ the Exercise of Freedom of Expression?, 4 N.J.C.L. 169, 197
(1994)).
67. Post, supra note 61, at 711. R
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public discourse: “the stream of information about public affairs is
polluted.”68
This concern for the quality of public debate is complemented
by a concern with participation.  The Hill Court reiterated the tradi-
tional common-law concern that reducing the protection of defa-
mation law might deter “sensitive and honourable men from
seeking public positions of trust and responsibility.”69
2. Dignity, Civility, and Public Deliberation and
Participation in Two Free Speech Traditions
None of these ideas are unique to Canadian free speech juris-
prudence.  They even find some resonance in strands of First
Amendment law.70  What emerges from a comparison of Sullivan
and Hill, however, is that each of these ideas — that the protection
of reputation can promote self-esteem, social order, and demo-
cratic deliberation — is more easily accommodated by the Cana-
dian Court.
Take first the private concern with self-esteem and dignity.  Al-
though courts in both systems emphasize these values, they adhere
to different conceptions of them.71  The conception of dignity re-
flected in the Canadian common law relies on reputation to protect
dignity, whereas a strong theme of First Amendment law is that dig-
nity lies in freedom of speech itself.72  One image that emerges
68. Hill, [1995] S.C.R. at 1185 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Build-
ers, Inc., 473 U.S. 749, 769 (1985) (White J., concurring)).
69. Hill, [1995] S.C.R. at 1174 (quoting RICHARD O’SULLIVAN, GATLEY ON LIBEL
AND SLANDER IN A CIVIL ACTION: WITH PRECEDENTS OF PLEADINGS (4th ed. 1953)).
70. In support of its conception of reputation as preserving dignity, the Supreme
Court of Canada cites Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92
(1966): “The right of a man to protection of his own reputation from unjustified inva-
sion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity
and worth of every human being — a concept at the root of any decent system of
ordered liberty.”  In support of its argument regarding the deprecation of truth in pub-
lic discourse, the Supreme Court of Canada quotes at length from the concurrence of
Justice White in Dun & Bradstreet, 473 U.S. at 769.
71. The Canadian treatment of reputation seems to bear some resemblance to the
European tradition described by James Q. Whitman as a tradition of “leveling up” — of
extending to all levels of respect formerly reserved  to those on the highest rung of the
social hierarchy. See James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect, 109 YALE L. J.
1279, 1385 (2000).
72. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (“The constitutional right of
free expression is . . . designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from
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from First Amendment law is of a capable, brave citizenry able to
withstand the unpleasantness of unregulated public discourse and
able to assess for itself the worth of ideas.73  That image is strong in
Justice Brandeis’s famous opinion in Whitney v. California74 which
invokes the character of the founders of the United States Constitu-
tion — “courageous self-reliant men, with confidence in the power
of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of
popular government”75 — to describe the ideals of the First
Amendment.76  A key virtue of the First Amendment is that it es-
chews the paternalism inherent in the governmental intervention
in public debate and recognizes its citizens’ full capacities.  “Dig-
nity” thus lies at the core of First Amendment justifications for free-
dom of speech, which emphasize the importance of free speech to
the expression of individuality and the development of indepen-
dent personality.77
That First Amendment conception of “freedom of speech as
dignity” also contains the counterpart to the Canadian idea that
reputation performs a public role.  According to some analyses of
the First Amendment, the dignified treatment of the citizenry
through freedom of speech has public benefits, albeit of a different
kind.  Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote in Cohen v. California of
“the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more
capable citizenry and more perfect polity.”78  The nature of the
public benefits that flow from the First Amendment’s protection of
speech is, of course, somewhat disputed.  One suggestion is that
recognizing the moral independence of the people encourages the
development of the independence and courage idealized in the
the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced
largely into the hands of each of us, . . . in the belief that no other approach would
comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political
system rests.”).
73. See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1567, 1572-74
(1999).
74. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
75. Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
76. See generally Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The
Brandeis Opinion in Whitney, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988).
77. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 9-10 (1992).
78. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
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Brandeis opinion in Whitney;79 another is that a principle of free-
dom of speech that extends even to highly unpleasant and unpopu-
lar forms of speech encourages the development of tolerance.80
Another suggestion still is that, by allowing the people to pursue
many “forms of life,” the First Amendment protects and promotes
cultural diversity.81
When we turn to the second of the public goods identified in
the Hill opinion — the promotion of public participation — the
tension with the First Amendment is, if anything, more obvious.
The notion that government can intervene to enhance public de-
bate for the purposes of improving democratic government,
though propounded by prominent First Amendment scholars,82
has met with strong resistance in the U.S. Supreme Court.  The
American free-speech tradition is replete with images that draw on,
or resonate with, a more free-market approach to public participa-
tion.  Though the Sullivan opinion does not cite Justice Holmes’s
famous statement,83 it reveals affinity with these ideas in citing,
among others, Judge Learned Hand: “right conclusions are more
likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through
any kind of authoritative selection.”84  The “marketplace” idea, as
Frederick Schauer has shown, is best understood as an idea about
democratic government.  Democratic government is best secured
by an absence of state control of expression because of the risk that
government will use its power to regulate speech self-interestedly or
incompetently.85
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS: LIBERAL AND COMMUNITARIAN
The contrast between these cases reveals deeper philosophical
trends.  First Amendment law is often taken to provide a vivid illus-
79. See Blasi, supra note 73, at 1577; Blasi, supra note 76, at 670. R
80. See LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 233 (1986).
81. See generally Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and the Law: Pornography, Blas-
phemy, and the First Amendment, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 297 (1988).
82. See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 28-33 (1996); CASS R. SUN-
STEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 34 (1993).
83. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (“The best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”).
84. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (cited
in Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270).
85. See SCHAUER, supra note 15, at 33-34. R
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-1\NLR101.txt unknown Seq: 18 20-FEB-06 12:09
26 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
tration of essential commitments of liberalism, whereas the Cana-
dian law of freedom of expression is widely accepted as having an
affinity with “communitarian” challenges to liberalism.86  The com-
parative study of Canadian and American free-speech law thus pro-
vides a case study in an important debate in modern political
philosophy.
Of course, one must be careful to avoid a simple equation of
either body of case law with either body of political thought.  Judg-
ing is a practical task performed under time constraints by lawyers
who may have little expertise in political theory and who have con-
siderable incentive to leave at least some of their more fundamental
justifying reasons unarticulated.87  Case law is therefore likely to re-
flect only elements of any particular philosophical position and may
contain multiple contradictory strands of thought.88  A perhaps
even more fundamental obstacle to the simple equation of any
body of case law with either “liberalism” or “communitarianism” is
the considerable complexity within these bodies of thought.89
Nonetheless, considering this comparative study through the lens
of the liberal-communitarian debate is helpful.
A. The Social Character of Human Beings
Various lines of thought associated with liberalism on the one
hand and communitarianism on the other are identifiable in these
cases on defamation of public figures.  A key tenet of communitari-
86. See GREENAWALT, supra note 13, at 149; Roy Leeper, Keegstra and R.A.V.: A R
Comparative Analysis of the Canadian and U.S. Approaches to Hate Speech Legislation, 5
COMM. L & POL’Y 295 (2000).
87. Judges make their decisions by reference to an existing body of law, which can
make it difficult to adopt theoretical positions that call into question decided cases.  In
addition, in multi-member courts, judges seek agreement with others, which creates an
incentive to compromise by avoiding statements of high-level propositions.  Further, as
a matter of strategy, judges may wish to avoid limiting their options in future case that
follows from articulating the high-level propositions that justify their positions in partic-
ular cases. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 41 (1999).
88. In addition, because of the relatively undertheorized nature of judicial deci-
sionmaking, judicial reasoning may be compatible with several more highly theorized
positions.  Modern civic republicanism, with its emphasis on political participation, is
another obvious candidate as an explanation for at least some aspects of Canadian free
speech law.  On the relationship between republicanism and communitarianism, see
PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM 120-26 (1997).
89. See Kymlicka, supra note 10, at 366. R
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anism is the importance to the individual of membership in groups
and, more generally, of communal life.90  Communitarianism seeks
to correct liberalism’s excessive individualism by elevating the im-
portance of relations within and among groups in constructing just
social and political arrangements.91  A communitarian conception
of rights92 would give more weight to communal life in determining
the nature and limits of rights.93
The Canadian response to the conflict between freedom of
speech and reputation reflects the communitarian emphasis on the
social character of human beings.  The Canadian Court protects
reputation because it understands reputation as an important
means by which individuals obtain membership in society and by
which communities order social relations.  By contrast, the Ameri-
can position, represented by Sullivan, values the development of
the individual through expressive freedom.  This argument is an
aspect of the more general understanding of liberalism that free-
dom of choice serves the person’s dignity on whom that freedom is
conferred.94  The American and Canadian cases thus reveal a differ-
ent understanding of the principal elements of a dignified, fulfil-
ling life; the Canadian cases show a communitarian appreciation
for communal ties, while the American cases show a liberal appreci-
ation of freedom.
B. Suspicion of the State
The debate between liberals and communitarians, by focusing
on the relationship between the two sets of ideas, is also helpful in
understanding the difference between American and Canadian def-
amation cases.  In response to the communitarian critique, some
liberals have argued that far from neglecting the importance of
90. One of the challenges for communitarianism is to identify the nature of the
“communities” that it values. See Kymlicka, supra note 10, at 376-77. R
91. The major communitarian theorists are usually thought to include Michael
Sandel, Charles Taylor, and Alasdair McIntyre. See generally MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBER-
ALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); ALASDAIR MCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN
MORAL THEORY (1981); CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1985).
92. Though a strong communitarian theory might abandon the idea of rights alto-
gether in favor of a conception of the common good.
93. See SANDEL, supra note 91, at x-xi; MCINTYRE, supra note 91; TAYLOR, supra note R
91. R
94. See SCHAUER, supra note 15, at 62. R
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“community” in human life, liberal ideals best protect that goal.  In
particular, it is said that the communitarian readiness to allow state
intervention risks abuse of state power, even to the point of totali-
tarianism.95  Thus, an element of the liberal-communitarian debate,
though not one always emphasized by the primary participants, is a
debate over the proper role of the state in the protection of com-
munal practices.  A commitment to limited government, founded
on a distrust of state power, is a key element of liberal theory in all
its various forms.  Communitarianism, by contrast, seems to be pre-
mised on the belief that communal ends can be properly secured
by the state with the consequence that the state is entitled to inter-
vene to protect valuable communal practices.96
Some critical accounts of Canadian law of freedom of expres-
sion mirror this aspect of the liberal response to communitarian-
ism.  Suspicion of state intervention is a general theme in American
political culture,97 but it finds especially clear expression in the
First Amendment.98  By contrast, the Canadian vision of freedom of
expression is more sympathetic toward the state, allowing interven-
tion in order to protect the institutions and practices — such as the
possession and acknowledgement of good reputation — which pro-
tect communal life and promote a healthy public debate.99  Conse-
95. For criticisms of the communitarian tendency to overlook the dangers posed
by the state, see BUCHANAN, supra note 11, at 860; Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics R
of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308, 318-20 (1985).
96. Indeed, on some accounts this is all there is to the debate since, it is argued,
liberalism does not neglect the value of the shared practices and communal life that are
the central concern of communitarians. See Kymlicka, supra note 10, at 373; Buchanan, R
supra note 11, at 860. R
97. See Schauer, supra note 4, at 23-24 (“[I]t is well-documented that for many R
years the degree of citizen distrust of government in the United States has been greater
than that in a vast number of other developed and developing nations, including some
number of countries whose citizens have considerably more reason to distrust their
governments than Americans have to distrust theirs . . . American distrust of govern-
ment is a contributing factor to a strongly libertarian approach to constitutional
rights.”) (citations omitted).
98. See Schauer, supra note 4. R
99. This is a theme in Canadian approaches to other Charter rights.  In a freedom
of religion case, Chief Justice Dickson wrote in an early Charter case, R. v. Edwards Books,
[1986] S.C.R. 713, 779: “In interpreting and applying the Charter I believe that the
courts must be cautious to ensure that it does not simply become an instrument of
better situated individuals to roll back legislation which has as its object the improve-
ment of the condition of less advantaged persons.”  I am grateful to Grant Huscroft for
this reference.
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quently, the Canadian position is seen as potentially totalitarian.
The dangerous naı̈vety of the Canadian law of freedom of expres-
sion is an occasional element of scholarly commentary on Canadian
free-speech law100 and a strong theme among commentators in
other contexts.101
This criticism of Canadian free-speech law is assisted by the rel-
ative inattention of Canadian constitutionalists to this question.
Proponents of Canadian law of freedom of expression have di-
rected their attention to exploring the relevant countervailing val-
ues — reputation in the cases considered here102 — that justify
limits to freedom of expression.  The focus on these questions, how-
ever, has come at the expense of noting, or critically analyzing, the
faith that Canadian constitutionalists exhibit in the capacity of the
state to act as a constructive agent in the pursuit of communal
goods.
Greater attention to this question will undoubtedly improve
the comparative study of free-speech law in these countries.  In par-
ticular, more sustained attention by proponents of Canadian consti-
tutionalism to the question of trusting the state will assist in
providing a fuller response to its critics.  That is a large project, and
here I will offer only a few preliminary observations.
The first point to note is that any challenge premised on the
First Amendment’s distrust of the state, inherent in Canadian free-
speech law, is only a moderate one.  There are aspects of Canadian
constitutionalism that bear an obvious debt to the liberal project of
limited government, not least of which is the adoption of the Char-
ter in 1982 that modified Canada’s traditional preference for parlia-
100. James Weinstein, Canadian Hate Speech Cases, in FREE EXPRESSION: ESSAYS IN
LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 175 (W.J. Waluchow ed., 1994).  Though, a number of important
comparativists avoid normative evaluation. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 13; R
Schauer, supra note 4. R
101. See, e.g., John Leo, Stomping on Free Speech, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr.
14, 2004, available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/opinion/articles/040419/
19john.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2005); David E. Bernstein, Canadian Thought Police on
the March, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Dec. 2, 2003, http://www.nationalreview.com/
comment/bernstein200312020910.asp (last visited Sept. 16, 2005).
102. Similarly, in comparing American and Canadian attitudes to hate speech and
pornography, emphasis is given to equality and multiculturalism. See Mahoney, supra
note 54, 251-52; Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation, Comparative Constitutionalism, and R
Fiss-ian Freedoms, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 265, 284-88 (2003).
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mentary sovereignty on questions of rights.103  The Canadian
Constitution — including its free-speech law — is therefore not
premised on an abandonment of the liberal insight that govern-
ment poses a threat to the individual.  Rather, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, the Charter gives traditional liberal rights104 some
special status, while at the same time remaining comparatively re-
ceptive to communitarian-inspired arguments for limitations on
those rights.
Secondly, to some extent, suspicion of government is a First
Amendment article of faith.  When Justice Holmes wrote that “the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market,” he immediately qualified the state-
ment: “That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution.”105  It is
open, then, for Canadians to argue that this degree of suspicion of
government is not the “theory” of their Constitution.  There is am-
ple basis for such an argument.  After all, far from the revolutionary
spirit of the founding period in the United States, the Canadian
Constitution grew out of the more prosaic desire on the part of the
Canadian colonies to resolve tensions between the English and
French speaking parts of Canada.106  Canada, moreover, has
achieved its independence from the United Kingdom only gradu-
ally, maintaining to this day symbolic ties to the monarchy.107
103. In this respect Australia provides a useful comparison.  The Australian Consti-
tution contains no comprehensive charter of rights (and contains only a limited kind of
free speech right), leaving the legislature in control of most rights issues. See generally
HILARY CHARLESWORTH, WRITING IN RIGHTS ch. 1 (2002) (stating that when the Austra-
lian Constitution is silent about a set of rights, it is up to the legislature to write legisla-
tion to protect these rights); see Adrienne Stone, Australia’s Constitutional Rights and the
Problem of Interpretive Disagreement, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 29-48 (2005).
104. The Charter also protects some rights that are not always considered “liberal
rights” such as group language and education rights. See, e.g., Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 23 (U.K.). See WILL
KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP (1995); Jeremy Waldron, Taking Group Rights
Carefully, in LITIGATING RIGHTS 203 (Grant Huscroft & Paul Rishworth eds., 2002).
105. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
106. See HOGG, supra note 5, at 33-38.
107. On the gradual achievement of Canadian independence, see generally HOGG,
supra note 5, at 45-59.  It is tempting also to place some weight on section 33 of the
Charter, which gives to the Canadian and provincial parliament the power to override
judicial determinations with respect to rights.  In theory, then, the Canadian parlia-
ments have the last word on rights issues, which is consistent with a comparatively re-
laxed attitude toward the dangers posed by state power.  However, it is difficult to
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There is, however, a final matter that is more difficult to re-
solve.  First Amendment theory is also driven by an empirically
based assessment of how governments will act.  The tendency to-
wards intolerance is regarded as natural and human,108 and thus is
a temptation to which all governments will eventually accede.
Moreover, American history is usually understood as demonstrating
that in periods of political turmoil and wide-spread fear, govern-
ment will give in to the temptations toward oppressive censor-
ship.109  In light of this experience, adherents to the First
Amendment predict that, without the restraint of a judicially en-
forced freedom of speech, government will engage in oppressive
censorship.
Testing such a claim is a difficult and complex process that will
not be attempted here.  But, recognizing its empirical basis is im-
portant.  It means that any claim that the First Amendment repre-
sents the only understanding of freedom of expression compatible
with democracy is open to argument on the basis of the evidence.
It also counsels caution in too readily transferring the “lessons” of
the First Amendment history to a different cultural and political
context.  It may be that in Canada, which had a long history of sta-
ble democratic government before the adoption of the Charter, there
accord it much significance in understanding Canada’s fundamental constitutional
commitments.  Section 33 is now rarely used and is subject to a strong political culture
opposed to its use. See Jamie Cameron, The Charter’s Legislative Override: Fear or Figment of
the Constitutional Imagination? in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CHARTER ERA (Grant Hus-
croft & Ian Brodie eds., 2004).
108. See Abrams 250 U.S. at 630 (“Persecution for the expression of opinions seems
to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a
certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep
away all opposition.”).
109. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 449, 463-65 (1985).  In particular, the period of anti-communist intolerance
following the Second World War is regarded as a “cautionary tale” of the First Amend-
ment, and key features of modern First Amendment law — especially the development
of rigorous standards of review — are seen as a response to this experience.  The con-
viction of leaders of the Communist Party of the United States for advocating the over-
throw of the United States was upheld in Dennis, 341 U.S. 494. Dennis stands alongside
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), as an
“anti-canonical” case, a case universally disapproved of but widely cited and taught be-
cause of its power to illuminate the danger of approaches to constitutional law. See
Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L. J. 243, 245, 251
n.33 (1998).
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is reason to relax, though not to abandon, the level of suspicion of
government.
CONCLUSION
A remaining challenge for proponents of Canadian free-
speech law, then, is to consider more closely, and to justify, the atti-
tude to state power revealed in its case law.  That is an especially
important task.  First Amendment law, for all its richness and rhe-
torical power, is not the dominant model for the rest of the
world.110  On the contrary, Canadian free-speech law seems to be
much closer to the mainstream positions developed in Europe and
in the British Commonwealth.  The rough consensus on free-
speech issues in these countries111 is no doubt facilitated by the
comparatively internationalist outlook of these courts.112  Attention
to the key underlying assumptions of Canadian constitutional law is
likely, therefore, to be important to the understanding of wide-
spread constitutional commitments.
110. See Schauer, supra note 4, at 3 (“[T]he American First Amendment, as authori- R
tatively interpreted, remains a recalcitrant outlier to a growing international under-
standing of what the freedom of expression entails.”).
111. Though there are of course a variety of positions held within these countries
as well.  Indeed, the question of defamation of public figures in Canada is somewhat
less protective of speech than other countries.  For example, though the countries of
the Commonwealth have usually rejected Sullivan, most have also extended the com-
mon law to provide more protection to criticism of public officials than is accorded in
Hill. See generally, Stone & Williams, supra note 3; see supra text accompanying note 39. R
112. Consider the references in Hill to Sullivan, cases from Australia and the
United Kingdom, and to International Law Reform Commission reports from various
Commonwealth countries. See Hill, [1995] S.C.R. at 1185-87.
